El origen del Estado de Bienestar Europeo

No fue por razones ideológicas como muchos piensan:

"During the long boom period, 1945-73, there was high sustained economic growth, particularly in France, Germany, and Italy, which were then the economic motors of Western Europe. Over those years, practices developed of essentially bribing the workers. This had a clear political background. The European right was politically discredited by its association with fascism (except for in Britain, which hadn’t had collaboration). The left, and particularly the far left, was discredited because of its association with communism. In country after country, there was a leftward move, an alliance between Christian Democratic parties, with the emphasis on democracy and Christianity and a social welfare model, rather than the traditional pro-business conservative policies of the American Republicans of the 1950s-60s, let alone the blood-and-soil rightwing fascism of the type of many interwar political parties.
These parties established pro-labor social welfare policies in an effort to woo organized labor away from the left, and in particular away from communism. This was also the nature of the social welfarism that the Catholic Church strongly pushed in the 1950s-60s in Christian Democratic parties. Christian Democrats dominated Italy in what was in effect a one-party state in that period; they were extraordinarily influential in Germany, the Benelux countries, and France.
A series of social models were established in which, in effect, the real cost of providing high levels of social welfare was ignored precisely because this was a period of general economic growth. Moving cheap labor from the countryside to the towns, catch-up borrowing of American industrial technology, the ready availability of investment capital, partly from America—all helped to ensure cheap energy prices and major economic growth.

This model came to a grinding halt in the 1970s, a decade of real crisis in Europe. There was political crisis—the revolution in Portugal, instability in Greece, major problems in the transfer of authority in Spain culminating in an attempted coup d’etat in 1981—and also serious social and economic problems, both east and west of the Iron Curtain. Because the communist states, which were relatively inefficient as well as brutal, had nevertheless also benefited from the long boom. But neither the Eastern nor Western European model worked well in the 1970s. The result was a decade of high levels of social problems, economic difficulties, and political instability.

The 1970s also saw, partly as a result, an unwillingness within Europe to confront the international situation. Americans complained in particular about a dramatic under-investment by the Europeans in their defense, their reliance on the American Cold War umbrella, and a lack of certainty of where they were politically."

El origen del Estado de Bienestar Europeo puede entonces entenderse como un subproducto de situaciones de la guerra fría donde las elites europeas venían una enorme amenaza del comunismo y a la vez podrían darse el lujo, gracias al dinero y "protección " de los gringos, de no tener que invertir tanto en defensa preventiva contra la Unión Sovietica.

Esta el Estado declinando?

Eso dice Martin van Creveld, profesor de historia de la Herew University y autor de el libro "The Rise and Decline of the State":

"Somewhere between 1945 and 1975, the type of political construct known as the state and characterized, above all, by the separation between the ruler and the organization peaked and may have gone into decline. As previously, this process was not the making of individual rulers, however powerful and...benevolent. It was not as if the people at the top suddenly became less power-hungry or more willing to let the people at the bottom do their own thing. Once again, the well-nigh global character of the changes indicates that they were produced by anonymous forces over which scarcely anybody could exercise any control. And in relation to which, indeed, the entire question of morality becomes almost irrelevant.

Perhaps the most important factor, and one that is taken so much for granted that it is often overlooked, was the introduction and subsequent proliferation of nuclear weapons. For the first time in history, nuclear weapons permitted those who possessed them to annihilate each other and, of course, those who did not possess them as well. To date all attempts to change this fact by discovering some kind of antidote have failed; indeed they scarcely even got off the ground. Nor do I think that the current plans to build a ballistic missile defense system are going to make a difference in this respect. While this is not the place to argue the case in detail, against so-called "rogue states" such as North Korea, Iraq and Iran it is not needed. Against a first or even second class power with a full nuclear arsenal at its disposal it is useless.

The proliferation of nuclear weapons has affected war, and large scale war as waged by the state in particular, in two opposed ways. First, to the extent that the opponent also possessed a second strike capability it turned warfare into suicide, thus negating Clausewitz’s definition of it as a continuation of policy with an admixture of other means. It used to be that states went to war in order to extend or defend their interests. By definition, though, the interests of a state are less important than its existence--indeed it is only that which exists that can have interests in the first place. To put it in a less abstract way, it is hard if not impossible to think of an "interest" that will justify putting Washington D.C., or New York, or Moscow, or Beijing, or New Delhi, or Tel Aviv, at risk of instant and complete annihilation. As Bernard Brodie wrote as long ago as 1946, nuclear weapons cannot, should not, be used. If they have to be used, then they have already failed in their purpose which can only be to deter. As a result, whereas during the centuries before 1945 war was a major instrument used by states to increase their power at the expense of other states, since then it has been waged almost exclusively between, or against, non-nuclear states; in other words, such states as were not first or even second rate players in the international system.

The second reason why nuclear weapons have had a dampening effect on major interstate war is psychological. As the late Moshe Dayan once said, nothing is more exciting for men than war; as he well knew but did not say, nobody is more likely to command the admiration of women than warriors. In so far as nuclear weapons make it impossible to resist and can indeed eliminate entire societies in the twinkling of an eye, however, there is nothing exciting about them. By the speed with which it kills and destroys even more than by its sheer power, nuclear war simply does not offer any room for the exercise and display of such qualities as pride, honor, courage, determination, endurance, and self sacrifice. Briefly, it does not provide scope for heroism; whereas from the time that the first woman gave birth to the first baby (thus demonstrating to men how useless they really are) heroism has been what war is all about.

Concomitant with the retreat of major interstate war states also began dismantling some of the systems with which, since 1850 or so, they have built up in order to hold their populations in check and secure their loyalty. To a large extent, their doing so was a result of the Arab-Israeli conflict which brought on the Energy Crisis and plunged the world into a recession. Recession and unemployment overburdened the welfare system. This in turn led to inflation; and inflation in turn meant that the state had to rob some of its citizens in order to maintain payments to the rest. Even where rising oil prices did not constitute a major problem, Austrian economics--and here I agree with the ideas presented by the Mises Institute--would have predicted that the very success of the welfare state in creating more extensive education systems, more expensive health services, more old people, and more single mothers would cause its size to increase and its cost to skyrocket. By 1980 even Switzerland, that bastion of sound money, had a budget deficit amounting to more than 5 percent of GNP."

No estoy convencido de esta teoría sobre el declive del Estado. Las causas que menciona Van Creveld aunque importante no me parece que tengan la suficiente fuerza para generar un proceso descentralización que lleve a un declive del Estado.

Incluso creo que lo peor del dominio del Estado en realidad esta por venir.

Sobre los sistemas de aseguramiento de salud

"As John Stossel goes over in Bad Medecine (21 SEP 2007, NY Sun), insurance is the worst way to pay for medical care invented. Prior to the war-time subsidies via tax-code, Americans looked after their own health care directly. Most individuals went uninsured and some purchased forms of what today would be considered 'catastrophic care' plans, although most would fall under the 'accidental death and dismemberment' concept of insurance. Health insurance, itself, while not unknown was not widely used and the need for individuals to understand their own health limited the utilization of health practitioners and medications to chronic diseases or immediate ailments. It should be noted that even the Influenza Epidemic did not cause a rush to 'health insurance', even with the death toll that came with it. By requiring individuals to pay their own way, health care costs were minimized and, yes, often at the expense of long-term health. This did not prevent overall life expectancy to continue to rise even without 'health insurance'. Today the cost of overhead to the 'health insurance' system is entirely due to the 'insurance' part and not the health part. Actual costs to the individual for actual doctor treatment time and not paying for paperwork has changed very little in America. What has changed is the need to keep and manage health insurance records, fill out forms, undergo third party governance of what is and is not good for one's health and, generally, time and effort spent in trying to keep track of all of this. That overhead has now changed the system itself to a document management system that, as a minor function, also delivers a little health care."

Nunca había caido en cuenta del fenomeno que menciona la ultima parte que de este texto.

Indudablemente nuestros sistemas de aseguramiento en salud requieren tal nivel de burocracia y papeleo que el objetivo parece haberse distorsionado.

No hay desayuno gratis

La realidad de la medicina estatal en el reino unido, el tipo de modelo "salud universal" que quieren imponernos aquí en Colombia:

"There is a view that all treatments should be available. Unfortunately, that's not possible,'' said Peter Littlejohns, NICE's clinical and public health director. ``There is a limited pot of money.''
He said the four cancer drugs provide a ``marginal benefit at quite often an extreme cost'' and that the agency had to keep in mind that funds spent on the medicines could be used elsewhere to help others at a greater value. ``Those are the hidden patients, the ones who benefit from the things the NHS does spend money on,'' Littlejohns said. "

Que lastima que la Corte Constitucional no entienda que los costos no pueden ser ilimitados.

Como funciona el gobierno....

Paul Krugman ganó el premio nobel de economía ayer. Así que se me dió por leer su autobiografía. Dado que krugman es un economista keynesiano y entusiasta del Estado de Bienestar, los programas sociales y la regulación, nunca me imaginé encontrar esta perla:

"After a little while, however, I began to notice how policy decisions are really made. The fact is that most senior officials have no idea what they are talking about: discussion at high-level meetings is startlingly primitive. (For example, the distinction between nominal and real interest rates tends to be regarded as a complex and useless bit of academic nitpicking). Furthermore, many powerful people prefer to take advice from those who make them feel comfortable rather than from those who will force them to think hard. That is, those who really manage to influence policy are usually the best courtiers, not the best analysts. I like to think that I am a good analyst, but I am certainly a very bad courtier. And so I was not tempted to stay on in Washington."

Dada estas experiencia por qué insisten en darle mas poder y funciones al gobierno? Por qué insisten en que el gobierno es la solución a todos los problemas de la sociedad?

Lo que se debe saber de la nacionalización de freedie mac y fannie mae

"The claim that this represents the failure of markets is more than a tad silly. Fannie and Freddie weren't truly private companies, didn't act like truly private companies, and wouldn't have been allowed to so dominate the market if they had been. This is yet another failure of a government program."

Megan Mcardle

Articulo del dia

"In this crucially important era, I have focused on one point: big business was a major source of American statism. Further researches would show, I am convinced, that big business and financial leaders were also the dominant force behind America’s increasingly interventionist foreign policy, and behind the ideology of modern liberalism. In fact, by this analysis sustained research might show American liberal intellectuals to be the “running dogs” of big businessmen, to twist a Marxist phrase a bit."

Roy A. Childs en "Big Business and the Rise of American Statism" (de 1971)

No hay nada como la historia para refutar las falsas creencias que abundan en el debate público.

Hechos del dia

El bueno:

The digital divide is beginning to close. The flow of digital information – through mobile phones, text messaging, and the Internet – is now reaching the world’s masses, even in the poorest countries, bringing with it a revolution in economics, politics, and society.
Extreme poverty is almost synonymous with extreme isolation, especially rural isolation. But mobile phones and wireless Internet end isolation, and will therefore prove to be the most transformative technology of economic development of our time.
The digital divide is ending not through a burst of civic responsibility, but mainly through market forces. Mobile phone technology is so powerful, and costs so little per unit of data transmission, that it has proved possible to sell mobile phone access to the poor. There are now more than 3.3 billion subscribers in the world, roughly one for every two people on the planet.
Moreover, market penetration in poor countries is rising sharply. India has around 300 million subscribers, with subscriptions rising by a stunning eight million or more per month. Brazil now has more than 130 million subscribers, and Indonesia has roughly 120 million. In Africa, which contains the world’s poorest countries, the market is soaring, with more than 280 million subscribers.

El malo:

El 88% de las reservas de petróleo convencional pertenece a gobiernos y esos gobiernos invierten cantidades insuficientes en nueva producción. Por su parte, el gobierno de Estados Unidos ha restringido las perforaciones costa afuera, en tierra firme y la conversión del carbón.

El espejo del colectivismo hidraúlico

En estos dias en que quieren imponernos la estatización/colectivización de la agua, es bueno conocer la realidad de paraíso colectivista por excelencia en relación con este tema:


"Hoy, los problemas debidos a la escasez de agua en la mayoría de los pueblos y ciudades de Cuba se han agudizado y empeoran debido al estado deplorable de las redes de distribución. La demanda de agua aumenta también debido al éxodo masivo, sobre todo de jóvenes campesinos, hacia pueblos y ciudades del país. No está claro si el estimado de 500,000 habitantes para la ciudad de Santiago de Cuba en el año 2000 se hizo realidad, pero la cantidad de campesinos sin tierras que arribaron allí durante las tres décadas anteriores pudo haber aumentado.

Similar situación presentaba la ciudad de Guantánamo, donde al principio de los años 90 se bombeaba el agua directamente del río Bano y se entregaba a las redes de distribución y a la población malamente tratada. Los muchos casos de gastroenteritis que se produjeron por aquella época en la ciudad se debieron a esa forma irresponsable de abastecer de agua a sus habitantes.

En los años 80 el agua que tomaban los habitantes de la ciudad de Camaguey presentaba una turbiedad evidente debido a un acueducto necesitado de urgente mantenimiento. Se mencionan solamente casos bien conocidos."

Cita del dia

"Nearly every reform proposal offered to fix "the health-care crisis" calls for increased governmental control of medicine. These proposals are the logical result of the belief that there is a "right" to medical care. But there is no such right. Rights, properly understood, do no include an entitlement to the services of others. "
— William Dale, en el libro “Free Medicine”

Claramente los que diseñaron nuestra constitución tenían una visión completamente opuesta.

Por eso no somos ricos

Situaciones como esta explican porque Colombia tiene un ingreso per capita mas alto.

En teoría somos un pais "capitalista" y ultimamente dizque existe un modelo neoliberal. En la realidad, nuestra economía esta llena de rentistas, carteles, oligopolios, regulaciones. Es una economía administrada y fuertemente intervenida. No es socialismo, porque la propiedad no es plenamente controlada por el Estado. Se acerca mas bien a un corporativismo fascistoide que beneficia a diferentes grupos de intereses, entre los cuales definitivamente no estan los consumidores.

Y lastimosamente Uribe, con todo su enorme capital político, en 6 años ha cambiado mas bien poco........

Economía minera, reevaluación y cambio institucional

Alejandro Gaviria sostiene en su ultima columna que "la minería podría, en últimas, propiciar la “casanarización” de Colombia."

Yo creo que mas que "casanarización" , podria propiciar "venezolanización".

El problema que se le esta presentado a Colombia podría llegar a ser lo que llaman una maldición de recursos. Por lo pronto, ya hay sintomas de algo así como una enfermedad holandesa con la entrada de tanto dolar que esta yendo a invertir en petroleo y minería, y que esta haciendole daño al aparato manufacturero agropecuario, en especial, el exportador.

Sobre las solcuiones hay una pregunta que me hago: porque varios analistas como Armando Montenegro dicen que la solución a la reevaluación de peso pasa porque el gobierno recorte de gasto (ayer parece que ya hizo algo interesante: anuncio un recorte de 10 billones de pesos en el presupuesto del próximo año)?

Segun le he entendido a economistas como Dani Rodrik y a otros, si el gobierno dismininuye gasto deberia la tasa de interes, al aumento el ahorro disponible. Y si disminuye la tasa de interes entonces entrarían menos dolares. Pero si la inversión extrajera es de tipo minero, si sera aplicable esta teoría?

Es decir, si sería cierto que reemplazaría inversión en minería y petrolo en dolares por inversión en minería y petroleo en pesos colombianos?

Las multinacionales y grandes empresas mineras/petroleras si buscarian financiacion local y no afuera?

Sobre el ascenso del fascismo

El efecto redistributivo de la hiperinflación de alemania a comienzos de los años 20:

"By 1924 the inflation had radically redistributed the wealth of Germany. The segment of society that was hit the hardest seems to have been the middle class. The poor had little wealth to lose while the rich were often able to get their wealth into forms not adversely affected by inflation. Wealth held in foreign bank accounts, gold and precious metals, and land maintained value."

Me pregunto si esto pudo influir en el ascenso del fascimo

Cita antiliberal del dia

"Es el estado quien educa a sus ciudadanos en civismo, les da consciencia de su misión, y forja su unidad"

Benito Mussolini